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Abstract
Since the end of World War II, British leaders have preached about reawakening the
country’s “Blitz Spirit” in times of disaster. Supposedly first shown by Britain’s civilian
population during the Blitz, this Blitz Spirit is widely understood today as a heroic display of
courage, perseverance, cheerfulness, unity, and the ability to “keep calm and carry on” in the
face of great danger and discomfort. Furthermore, Britain trumpets this Blitz Spirit as being
unique and inherent to British culture. Drawing from radio broadcasts, photographs, propaganda
posters and films, the wartime morale reports of the Mass-Observation social research project,
and other primary sources, as well as the work of other historians, I seek to uncover the true Blitz
Spirit and how it became an integral – if somewhat mythicized – element of Britain’s modern
identity. First, I explore the emergence of the Blitz Spirit during World War II, identifying
contemporary gaps between reality and propagandistic myth. I conclude that while the people of
Britain did not live up to propagandistic representations of the Blitz Spirit, they lived out their
own form of the Blitz Spirit through their everyday existence. Characterized by grim
determination rather than sustained zeal for the war effort, the Blitz Spirit of World War II was
merely a British manifestation of the natural human tendency to endure through hardship. It was
only sporadically heroic, and it had its limits. Then, I unravel the idea that the Blitz Spirit
belongs solely to Britain by comparing the British, German, Chinese, and Japanese civilian
responses to air raid tactics. Finally, I examine postwar newspaper articles and government
statements, especially in relation to modern catastrophes like the “July 7th bombings” and the
COVID-19 Pandemic, to analyze how the Blitz Spirit has become fixed in the British cultural
psyche. Referencing the work of historians like Darren Kelsey, I conclude that the Blitz Spirit of
today, still used in a propagandistic manner to spark unity and resilience in the face of disaster, is
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nonetheless a severely mythicized version of a past reality. Essentialized from the very
beginning, the Blitz Spirit has gradually been transformed into a historical fairytale.

Keywords: History, World War II, home front, Blitz; Blitz Spirit, civilian morale, propaganda,
myth, Keep Calm and Carry On, People's War, Mass-Observation, attacks on civilians, Keep
Smiling Through, panic
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Introduction
In modern times of crisis, including during the recent COVID-19 Pandemic, Britain’s
politicians and journalists have often urged the British people to find their inner “Blitz Spirit.”1
Harkening back to the country’s courageous response to the Blitz – an intense air raid campaign
launched by the Germans against the British during World War II – these public figures are
calling for a dramatic increase in unity, altruism, and cheerful endurance, among other responses.
Many bemoan the loss of the Blitz Spirit, speculating both on how this may have happened and
how this spirit might be reclaimed. At the same time, however, some are now calling into
question the reality of the Blitz Spirit, suggesting that the heroic qualities of Britain’s civilian
response to the Blitz were largely the inventions of propaganda.
Some skeptics have viewed the pandemic as an opportunity to expose the tarnished
reality of the Blitz Spirit, venturing so far as to deny its very existence. Rachel Cooke of The
Guardian, for example, blasts those who look to the bearers of the Blitz Spirit as an example,
writing, “Stop invoking the plucky Blitz spirit and growing your own beans: the halcyon days of
make do and mend were just a myth.”2 Julie V. Gottlieb, history professor at the University of
Sheffield, insists that the Blitz Spirit “was entirely prescriptive, as the wartime government
feared, and with good reason, epidemic outbreaks of hysteria and panic in a war from the air.”3

Richard Overy, “Why the Cruel Myth of the ‘Blitz Spirit’ is No Model for How to Fight Coronavirus,” The
Guardian, Mar. 19, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/19/myth-blitz-spirit-modelcoronavirus
1

Rachel Cooke, “Turnips for a Month? Why Brexiters’ food nostalgia is folly,” The Guardian, February 23,
2019, https://www.theguardian.com/food/2019/feb/23/brexit-food-folly-turnips-for-a-month
2

Julie V. Gottlieb, “Not Keeping Calm,” The Times Literary Supplement, Oct. 9, 2020, https://www.thetls.co.uk/articles/british-morale-other-myths-blitz-book-review/
3
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Under the headlines “Cruel Britannia,” Politico’s Otto English scathingly compares Britain’s
response to the pandemic to “the wartime notion of ‘keep calm and carry on’ that was as devoid
of sense as it was a reckless waste of precious time.”4 Indeed, English argues that the modern
Blitz Spirit is nothing more than an elaborate charade, supported especially by conservatives for
political purposes. According to English, both the pandemic and the Blitz have unraveled
Britain’s “hubris” by knocking her off of her pedestal of “exceptionalism.”5 Even among
historians and journalists who acknowledge the existence of the Blitz Spirit, many still refer to it
as myth, contributing to the erroneous idea that the Blitz Spirit was and is just a rallying cry
invented by the government to gain public support and cooperation.
While evidence for the existence of this propagandistic version of the Blitz Spirit is
mixed, the true Blitz Spirit can be found in the everyday acts of survival of a people under fire –
in their propensity to “keep calm and carry on.” Meanwhile, historians have also cast some doubt
on the common claim that the Blitz Spirit belongs solely to British culture. If historians concede
that the Blitz Spirit was, in fact, more than a myth, then the Britons who lived through the Blitz
must share the stage with their enemies, as both the Germans and the Chinese endured similar
attacks on their civilian populations while maintaining the same “stiff upper lip.” Regardless of
the extent to which Britons or other groups of people displayed it, however, the idealized version
of the Blitz Spirit that Britain knows and loves today has undoubtedly shaped both the country’s
international reputation and its understanding of its own identity.
Depressing Expectations and the Corresponding Preparations

4

Otto English, “Cruel Britannia: Coronavirus Lays Waste to British Exceptionalism,” Politico, May 5, 2020,
https://www.politico.eu/article/cruel-britannia-coronavirus-lays-waste-to-british-exceptionalism/
5

Otto English, “Cruel Britannia, n.p.
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Naturally, the Blitz began with a bang. On September 7, 1940, the Germans conducted a
massive bombing raid over London.6 By definition, a “blitz” is an air raid on a single region, in a
single night, involving over 100 bombers. Britain’s Blitz, however, earned itself a capital “B” for
its extreme length and intensity. Indeed, Luftwaffe bombers would pay nightly visits to Britain
until the middle of May of 1941, when they delivered both a record bombing of London and a
last-ditch attack on Birmingham.7 In all, 43,000 civilians were killed during the Blitz8 and by the
end of the war, one in every seven British homes had been damaged or destroyed by the
bombing.9 Although the experiences of different towns varied considerably, there is no doubt
that all British civilians were asked to bear a new kind of wartime burden during World War II.
The war was appropriately dubbed the “People's War” because the civilians were directly
involved in the fight for victory.10 Notably, injuries greatly outnumbered deaths, so “near
misses” were pretty common. This means that a large number of civilians had a front row seat
for the air raids that rocked the country.11 Thus, during the Blitz, Britons experienced war more
intimately than ever before; cities became battlefields, and their inhabitants became soldiers.12

6

Robert Mackay, Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britain During the Second World War (Manchester:
Manchester Universtiy Press, 2002), 68.
7

David Clampin, Advertising and Propaganda in World War II: Cultural Identity and the Blitz Spirit (London:
Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 7.
8

Mackay, Half the Battle, 68.

9

Clampin, Advertising and Propaganda, 7.

10

Clampin, Advertising and Propaganda, xiii-xiv.

11

Mackay, Half the Battle, 69.

Donny Gluckstein, A People’s History of the Second World War: Resistance Versus Empire (Pluto Press, 2012),
97, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt183p5p8.
12
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The Germans expected their nightly bombing raids to not only crush Britain’s morale, but
also to instigate a revolution that would weaken the country and secure their ultimate victory.13
During the “Phoney War” that preceded the Blitz - a frustratingly quiet period of impending
doom for Britain that lasted from September of 1939 to June of 1940 - many feared that the
Germans would succeed in their mission.14 Even Britain’s leaders expected the country to fall to
pieces once the bombing began, as evidenced by their frantic efforts to prepare for mass panic.15
Indeed, although they would be called on to play the part of soldiers, the civilian population
possessed neither the training nor the experience of a soldier, and the British Government
assumed that they would be ill-suited for this role.16 Believing that the psychological toll of the
bombing would be enough to drive the whole country crazy - literally - the government arranged
for the creation of several new mental health clinics, multiple within London.17 In particular,
Britain’s leaders suspected weakness and disloyalty of both the poorest and richest members of
society. They viewed these populations as especially susceptible to German influence, as the
former would be experiencing a heightened degree of misery during the Blitz, and the latter had
much to lose during the crisis.18 In general, Britain’s leaders regarded civilians as disorganized,
undisciplined, and, worst of all, selfish. There was an overarching concern that most Britons

13

Gluckstein, A People’s History, 97-98.

Edgar Jones, Robin Woolven, Bill Durodié, and Simon Wessely, “Public Panic and Morale: Second World War
Civilian Responses Re-Examined in the Light of the Current Anti-Terrorist Campaign,” Journal of Risk Research 9,
no. 1 (2006): 59, https://www-tandfonline-com.libproxy.unl.edu/doi/full/10.1080/13669870500289005
14

15

Mackay, Half the Battle, 74.

Brad Beaven and John Griffiths, “The Blitz, Civilian Morale and the City: Mass-Observation and Working-Class
Culture in Britain, 1940-41,” Urban History 26, no. 1 (1999): 75-76, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44613021.
16

17

Mackay, Half the Battle, 80.

18

Jones et al., “Public Panic and Morale,” 68.
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would think only about their own wellbeing and fail to support their neighbors and their country
in their darkest hour. As a result, before and during the Blitz, the British Government paid
special attention to civilian morale, doing everything in its power to unify the country and
insulate it against discontent.19
Even before the war started, the British Government began preparing propaganda
campaigns that they hoped would help the country survive the Blitz. The Ministry of
Information, which had been disbanded at the end of World War I, was resurrected in 1935, long
before the outbreak of World War II.20 The Ministry began designing and releasing wartime
propaganda posters in 1939. These first posters were meant to be simple, yet striking, and to
appeal to a wide audience. Most importantly, the aim of these posters was to steel Britons against
panic and inspire them to extraordinary action. Soon, a design was created to which many
different slogans could be applied. It featured simple white lettering and a white crown, backed
in one of six bold colors. In the end, three slogans were chosen to adorn the first propaganda
posters: “Your Courage, Your Cheerfulness, Your Resolution will Bring us Victory,” Freedom is
in Peril. Defend it With all Your Might,” and, of course, “Keep Calm and Carry On.” Together,
these slogans encompassed all of the messages that would eventually be associated with the Blitz
Spirit.21 In addition, realizing that it would need input directly from the people in order to design
effective propaganda, the Ministry of Information decided to trust the morale reports of external
survey organizations like Mass-Observation. M-O collected information about morale among the

19

Beaven and Griffiths, “The Blitz, Civilian Morale, and the City,” 75-76; Gluckstein, A People’s History, 97-98.

20

Bex Lewis, Keep Calm and Carry On: The Truth Behind the Poster (London: Imperial War Museums Press,
2017), 23.
21

Lewis, Keep Calm and Carry On, 41-58.
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lower classes during World War II by both conducting interviews with lower-class individuals
and covertly observing their day-to-day behaviors. Alongside propaganda pieces created by the
Ministry, these reports greatly contributed to the development of the concept of the Blitz Spirit.22
Even as the government fretted behind the scenes, it chose to limit conspicuous
preparations, such as the building of large air raid shelters, for a couple of reasons. First,
Britain’s leaders feared that an abundance of caution would strike unnecessary fear into the
hearts of civilians. While the danger of being killed by a bomb was very real during the Blitz,
Britain’s leaders believed that widespread panic would lead to the downfall of the nation, and
that this panic might be incited by an excess of preparation. In addition, they predicted that if an
effective deep-shelter system was created, it might protect Britain’s civilians, but it might also
cause them to develop a “shelter mentality.” In other words, if the government provided Britons
with good places to hide from the bombs, they might never come out, and both production and
morale would swiftly drop.23 As a result, when the bombs finally fell, civilians suddenly found
themselves in both a frightening and frightfully uncomfortable existence. Most communal
shelters were not designed to hold as many people as they usually ended up holding, nor to serve
as overnight sleeping spots. Most were dark, cold, damp, and completely lacking in
conveniences.24 In this way, while the government was trying desperately to preserve the
country’s morale, it was simultaneously undoing its efforts. It is important to keep these lessthan-ideal conditions in mind while discussing the reality of the Blitz Spirit, as this paper argues
that they add a hint of heroicism to even the most ordinary of everyday tasks.

22

Beaven and Griffiths, “The Blitz, Civilian Morale, and the City,” 75-76.

23

Jones et al., “Public Panic and Morale,” 62-63.

24

Mackay, Half the Battle, 71.
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When the bombs finally fell, the British civilian population shocked the government –
and the Germans – with its resilient response, a response now famously known as the “Blitz
Spirit.” At night, people took shelter wherever they could, and in the morning, they went about
the business of living, seemingly as if nothing extraordinary had happened.25 Few Britons
actually adopted the “shelter mentality,” and those who did were forcibly removed from their
shelters without attracting much attention. 26 Meanwhile, those who did not feel safe sheltering at
home and could not find adequate places to stay in communal shelters migrated to the edges of
towns to sleep. Called “trekking,” this practice was common among those who wanted to escape
the bombing but could not afford to abandon their homes and jobs.27 Thus, one way or another,
Britons found ways to function during the Blitz, and this unexpected resilience gave birth to the
idea of the Blitz Spirit.
The Propagandistic Blitz Spirit
According to its propagandistic definition within the context of World War II, the Blitz
Spirit was a collective response to wartime crisis and inconvenience, characterized by heroic
courage, perseverance, cheerfulness, unity, personal responsibility, and the ability to “keep calm
and carry on.” All of these ideals were already being promoted by the British government as the
core tenets of the “People’s War,” but they took on a new life when they were synthesized into
the concept of the Blitz Spirit. The story goes that the people as a whole displayed these traits
during their initial response to the Blitz, and that this response inspired the Blitz Spirit

25

Clampin, Advertising and Propaganda, 8-9.

26

Jones et al., “Public Panic and Morale,” 62-63.

27

Mackay, Half the Battle, 72.
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propaganda campaign (and not the other way around).28 According to this line of thinking, the
Blitz Spirit was not merely the product of a stressful situation, but rather a reflection of the
country’s character. Following the first few attacks, the British Government assumed - and
proclaimed to the world - that Britons had responded so well to the bombing because they were
British, and this idea became central to the propaganda produced during this period.29 Indeed,
from then on, Britain’s propagandists tried to pull the nation together by forging a new common
British identity using familiar patriotic symbols, stories, and traditions.30 Today, many still
adhere to the belief that Britons displayed their true British colors during the Blitz, and that their
cultural identity is intertwined with this Blitz experience. 31
One crucial aspect of the Blitz Spirit was adaptability. Britain became immensely proud
of its ability to adapt to the most extreme of wartime circumstances. When bombs fell overhead,
and when homes were destroyed, the country simply improvised—supposedly without any fuss.
The government quickly framed adaptability as a sort of secret weapon that would help the
British defeat the Germans. 32 A quintessential example of this adaptability was the ability of
many Britons to improvise in their search for shelter during air raids. Many set up their own
communal shelters beneath churches, factories, and railway arches. 33 Most famously, some

28

Clampin, Advertising and Propaganda, xiv-xv.

29

Clampin, Advertising and Propaganda, 6-12.

Darren Kelsey, “The Myth of the ‘Blitz Spirit’ in British Newspaper Responses to the July 7th Bombings,” Social
Semiotics 23, no. 1 (2013): 84, https://web-a-ebscohostcom.libproxy.unl.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=db86cac1-a8c7-4fe6-8d05217bc10fb7e1%40sessionmgr4008
30

31

Clampin, Advertising and Propaganda, 4.

32

Clampin, Advertising and Propaganda, xviii

Geoffrey Field. “Nights Underground in Darkest London: The Blitz, 1940-1941,” International Labor and
Working-Class History, no. 62 (2002): 14, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27672803.
33
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Britons were forced to flee to stations of the London Underground. The Tube stations are located
sixty feet underground, making them perfect makeshift bomb shelters. Underground officials
initially hesitated to allow people to take shelter in the Tube stations. First and foremost, they
feared that this would prevent the Underground from quickly transporting troops across the
country. In addition, many disliked the idea of creating shelters that would attract members of
the lower classes to these typically middle-and-upper class spaces. Many Britons took matters
into their own hands, however. Without any official permission, they began using the
Underground as a public shelter, treating trains and even station platforms as bombing raid beds.
Realizing that they could not prevent the masses from flooding into the Underground at night,
the government finally yielded and designated many platforms and sections of tunnels – fifteen
miles in all – as public shelters. Many people actually preferred the Tube shelters to aboveground shelters. The tunnels and platforms were so far underground that they could escape the
sounds of the bombing, as well as enjoy well-lit areas without fear of being spotted by the
enemy. Tube officials did their best to make the Underground even more welcoming by
providing first aid and refreshments to weary shelterers. As a dramatic and straightforward
example of the Blitz Spirit, the act of taking shelter in a Tube station during a bombing raid
became a symbol of British patriotism, flexibility, and toughness.34
Displayed in the popular wartime slogan, “Keep smiling through,” another aspect of the
propagandistic Blitz Spirit was undying cheerfulness.35 Indeed, it was not enough for British
civilians to remain calm during the Blitz; they were also expected to laugh in the face of danger,

Danielle K. Dodson, “Minding the Gap: Uncovering the Underground’s Role in the Formation of Modern
London, 1855 – 1945” (PhD diss., University of Kentucky, 2016), 249-252.
34

35

Clampin, Advertising and Propaganda, 4.
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as a sign of British strength.36 Rather than cowering in dark, gloomy shelters, weeping and
waiting for morning, the British people supposedly spent their fearful nights laughing, singing,
and otherwise having fun, effortlessly distracting themselves. One image of a group of young
boys cheerfully playing cards in an underground shelter – a photograph taken by a Ministry of
Information photographer – captures this idea of “smiling through,”37 as does the “Keep Calm
and Carry On” poster’s sister, “Your Courage, Your Cheerfulness, Your Resolution will Bring us
Victory.”38 This message was so ubiquitous that it bled into common advertising. One
contemporary ad for boot polish, for example, read, “Carry on with a smile and a cherry blossom
boot polish shine.”39 All in all, a smile was seen as a badge of strength and patriotism.
As aforementioned, increasing unity was a key goal of the Blitz Spirit propaganda
campaign. The government understood that without the people’s unified cooperation, they would
never be able to lead the country to victory. They also knew that they could not garner this fullfledged support through force. Instead, they had to try to appeal to the people’s emotions – their
patriotism, their compassion, and especially their sense of responsibility to their fellow Britons.40
Thus, war-related volunteering was advertised as a way for civilians to do their part for the war
effort, but the government also hoped that it would bring about enhanced unity.41 Meanwhile, the
36

Kelsey, “The Myth of the ‘Blitz Spirit,’” 83.

37

Ministry of Information, Life in an Air Raid Shelter, Southeast London, England, 1940, 1940, Ministry of
Information Second World War Official Collection, Imperial War Museums, D 1619,
https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205197841
38

Lewis, Keep Calm and Carry On, 47.

David Clampin, “Building the Meaning of the Second World War on the British Home Front in Commercial Press
Advertising,” Media History 23, no. 3-4 (2017): 480-481, https://web-p-ebscohostcom.libproxy.unl.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=b9c9459d-0915-47bf-89e4-c47314db9e8e%40redis
39

40

41

Clampin, Advertising and Propaganda, xiv.

Mark Clapson, The Blitz Companion: Aerial Warfare, Civilians and the City since 1911 (London: University of
Westminster Press, 2019), 67.
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mingling of people from different social classes and backgrounds in communal shelters was seen
as an opportunity to draw the country together. Many of those who ended up in the Underground
shelters were members of the lower classes – “cockneys” – because their impoverished
neighborhoods could not offer them adequate shelter.42 Thus, many argued that Britain would
have to shed its classist attitudes for the sake of the war effort. Once looked down upon as the
scum of society, the poor were now heralded as wartime heroes, persevering through great
hardship because their country needed them. Meanwhile, to demonstrate their commitment to
unity, many celebrities visited the shelters, alongside clergymen and journalists, to offer support
and encouragement to sheltering families.43
One piece of propaganda that effectively summed up the Blitz Spirit was a short film
titled “London Can Take It.” Released in 1940 by the Ministry of Information, the intended
audience of this film was actually not British civilians, but Americans. Indeed, the film is
narrated by American correspondent Quentin Reynolds, who clearly addresses the world on
behalf of Britain and not the British civilians themselves. However, a different cut of the film
was eventually released in Britain under the title “Britain Can Take It,” so while it may be
viewed as an example of how the British Government wished to portray the country on the
international stage, it also reveals the core elements of the propagandistic definition of the Blitz
Spirit. Furthermore, because at least some parts of the film consist of candid footage, “London
Can Take It” serves as proof that the Blitz Spirit was not entirely fabricated for propaganda

42

Tom Harrisson, Living through the Blitz (London: Collins, 1976), 113

43

Field, “Nights Underground,” 16.
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purposes.44 The tone of the film, however, is decidedly propagandistic, and some of the footage
may have been staged or inspired by the presence of cameramen.
Britain’s ability to “keep calm and carry on” is a pervasive theme throughout the film,
although it is never explicitly stated. Propaganda posters bearing messages such as “Carry on
London and keep your chin up!” are displayed prominently. Poignant footage of weary couples
cuddling in bomb shelters, children valiantly seeking sleep amidst the raucous sounds of war,
men playing darts in an underground bomb shelter, a woman casually pushing some debris off
her front stoop as she emerges from her home to pick up the morning milk – which was still
delivered after a raid – young women taking a horse-drawn carriage to work because their train is
not running, stores opening right on time following a devastating raid – the owners serenely
sweeping buckets of glass away from their stores and the customers seeming to take no notice of
the lack of doors, walls, and windows – and people strolling past massive piles of rubble without
even glancing at them all demonstrate that Britain’s wheels kept turning even during the Blitz.
As this footage is shown, Reynolds states, “This is not a pleasant way to spend the night, but the
people accept it as their part in the defense of London. These civilians are good soldiers.” It was
this stubbornness that supposedly made Britons “the greatest civilian army ever to be
assembled,” comparable to a determined boxer who rises after every fall.45
A clear and consistent rallying cry during the Blitz, the idea of the Blitz Spirit has
undoubtedly become an integral part of Britain’s modern identity. Recently, however, the reality
of this Blitz Spirit has been called into question. Historians are currently investigating, for

44

45

Clampin, Advertising and Propaganda, 5.

Ministry of Information, London Can Take It, 35mm reel, London: Ministry of Information, 1940,
https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1060022009
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example, the common conception that heightened British unity during the Blitz tore down
socioeconomic walls.46 They are also questioning the extent of Britons’ wartime cheerfulness
and resilience. Overall, they are looking to discover the deficit between propagandistic, popular,
and personal understandings of what the Blitz Spirit was and is today. Some claim that the
version of the Blitz Spirit portrayed in wartime propaganda was in no way exaggerated, and
others insist that it was completely fabricated, but the truth lies somewhere in between these two
extremes.
When Reality Reflected the Ideal
At first, during the “Phoney War,” it seemed that everyone’s suspicions of morale failure
would be confirmed. Patriotism was in low supply. Because there were no major developments
during this time, many foolishly hoped that Britain would not be drawn deep into the war;
invasion and air attacks were far from most Britons’ minds. Due to widespread disbelief in the
realities of the war, it was not until the chaotic evacuation of Dunkirk in May of 1940 that
Britain at last took up the Blitz Spirit. Realizing that their country was truly in danger, the people
finally took up the cause with zeal, adopting an attitude of altruism and connecting with fellow
Britons from all walks of life. 47
The term “Blitz Spirit” was inspired by the truly courageous and surprisingly cheerful
response of Londoners to the first bombing raid on the city’s East End in September 1940.48 It
was this response that gave birth to the idea of the Blitz Spirit. Of course, panic reigned
somewhat in the very beginning, according to Mass-Observation reports. In his book about the

46

Beaven and Griffiths, “The Blitz, Civilian Morale, and the City,” 72.

47

Clampin, Advertising and Propaganda, xv-xvii.

48

Clampin, Advertising and Propaganda, 5-6.
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reports, co-founder of Mass-Observation Tom Harrisson relates heartbreakingly chaotic scenes
from East London during the first few nights of bombing. Harrisson describes how people
screamed, wept, snapped at each other, and silenced those few who tried to drown out the sounds
of the bombing with cheerful singing.49 He also claims, however, that “by mid-month [of
September 1940], little remained of the earlier screaming and near-panic…Instead, a sturdy,
cheeky sort of attitude was growing.”50 The many mental health clinics that had been designed
by the government to accommodate floods of patients stood mostly empty; only a slight increase
in “neurotic illness” was reported throughout the duration of the Blitz. 51 In short, Britain did
respond courageously to the onset of the Blitz – or at least more courageously than most had
suspected – and a significant change in the country’s wartime demeanor was witnessed.52 This
very real transformation lies at the roots of the propagandistic idea of the Blitz Spirit.
The purest example of how Britons fulfilled the heroic altruism of the Blitz Spirit is the
increased appetite of the people to serve their communities. Indeed, during the Blitz, Britain’s
war effort was characterized by a high level of “voluntaryism” – a heartfelt habit of doing one’s
duty.53 This attitude shift was expressed in a sudden uptick in participation in volunteer
organizations like the Auxiliary Fire Service and the Home Guard. By joining these groups,
British civilians were able to participate in the war effort in a more active and tangible way than
merely “keeping calm and carrying on.”54 These “heroes by night” are featured prominently in

49

Harrisson, Living through the Blitz, 59-60

50

Harrisson, Living through the Blitz, 65.

51

Jones et al., “Public Panic and Morale,” 65; Mackay, Half the Battle, 80.

52

Harrisson, Living through the Blitz, 65-66.

53

Clampin, Advertising and Propaganda, xiv.
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“London Can Take It,” presented as evidence of Britain’s stout courage and determinedness to
fight to the bitter end.55 This voluntaryism also strengthened the country’s sense of unity; though
scattered throughout the country, these civilian soldiers recognized that they were all fighting for
a common cause.56
In many ways, the London Tube shelters also served as theatrical and conspicuous
examples of the idealistic Blitz Spirit being played out in real life. As aforementioned, the lowerclass Britons that flooded the Tube shelters were portrayed as heroic by the Blitz Spirit
propaganda campaign, an attempt by the government to both advertise Britain’s strength and
unify the country across socioeconomic lines. There is some evidence that the latter goal was
accomplished, but not primarily through government propaganda efforts.57 Instead, it was the
shelterers themselves who brought about the defeat of some discriminatory social norms. Indeed,
when members of the lower classes demanded that they be allowed to take shelter in the
Underground during nightly bombing raids, they implicitly declared their right to be there during
the day and in peacetime. Furthermore, lower-class Britons used this opportunity to prove to
their social superiors that they were not, in fact, boorish, dangerous, or in any way uncivilized by
remaining patient and polite in the midst of great discomfort.58 In general, unity seemed to
abound in the shelters. One Mass-Observation report describes this remarkable harmony
experienced by many shelterers: “Most of the people in the station are ‘regulars’; they settle on
the same bit of platform every night and know the ‘neighbours’…Someone stops and says to a
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group on the stairs: ‘Excuse me, but weren’t you the people who lent me a cigarette last night…’
– and insists on repaying it.”59 On the whole, it appears that the Underground shelterers behaved
better than most had assumed they would.60
Even more incredible than the maintenance of common decency was the development of
relationships between strangers in the Tube shelters. Close-knit communities, complete with
their own newsletters, bulletins, and even their own forms of government, quickly formed in the
shelters.61 Many shelterers contributed to some sort of communal fund for their shelter. The
money collected was typically put towards providing necessities like disinfectants and other
hygiene items to the community, as well as tipping those who had to clean up after the shelterers
in the morning. Unwritten rules were developed to maintain order, and separate spaces were set
aside – a baby nursery, a smoking section, a play area for children, a sleeping area, and so on. In
most shelters, a committee was created to make decisions for the community, delegate chores,
lobby for better conditions, and even arrange entertainment for the shelter’s enjoyment. Some
shelter “families” grew to be so close that thousands of people continued to camp out in the
Underground years after the Blitz ended, loathe to leave the warmth of the relationships they had
made and return to the cold reality of wartime living.62 One poster created by the Underground in
1941 captures the significance of Tube sheltering to wartime morale in Britain particularly well.
The poster features a man walking up the stairs from the Underground to the streets of London
above. His body is flooded in a pool of light, but his head, having already reached the surface, is
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cloaked in darkness. The poster reads, “When coming up from the brightly-lit below-ground
station pause and let your eyes grow accustomed to the gloom.” The lighting and word choice
used in this poster are highly symbolic. First, the warm, cheerful light of the Underground
represents the Blitz Spirit, made visible in the supportive and self-sacrificing communities that
sprung up spontaneously in the Tube shelters. Second, the darkness – the “gloom” – to which the
man in the poster is returning represents the gloom of war, against which the British were
fighting.63 In short, communal bomb shelters like those set up in the Underground not only
provided safe places where people could hide from the bombs, but also emotional support and
comradery that helped many survive the war.64 Breeding grounds for unity and strength, these
communal shelters are a prime example of the Blitz Spirit in action.
Still another example of reality reflecting the idealistic Blitz Spirit is the country’s special
efforts to “keep smiling through.” In large cities, evening activities were largely eliminated with
the onset of nightly raids. Furthermore, quietly reading a book or listening to the radio was
impossible for many during the raids because of the constraints of where they were forced to take
shelter. Therefore, many Britons had to cope with a sudden loss of leisure, and thus a sudden loss
of methods of distraction.65 As a result, “shelter entertainment” soon developed into a
bourgeoning Home Front campaign. Shelter committees regularly organized community events
such as dances, religious services, dart matches, film shows, and amateur entertainment nights,
all in an attempt to raise morale. Outside organizations soon became involved, as well. For
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example, the Entertainments National Service Association put on weekly concerts in select
shelters, and the Women’s Voluntary Service created “story-corners” and children’s play areas in
shelters throughout Britain. The Unity Theater and other thespian troupes also put on shows in
shelters around the county, including the Tube shelters. At the same time, several groups tried to
fine-tune the cultural tastes of the masses by exposing shelterers to classical music and literature.
Indeed, the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts went so far as to send
representatives into the Underground with gramophones, and library services were created
expressly for the shelterers by local advocacy groups. The London County Council offered selfimprovement evening courses to shelterers – a whopping 464 of them, to be exact. Even the
Underground itself felt compelled to help entertain the masses of people camped out on its
platforms. With an aim to educate Londoners about the war, and thus ease their fears, the
Underground cooperated with the Ministry of Information to set up propaganda exhibits at
Charing Cross station. Meanwhile, community groups such as sewing circles and discussion
groups popped up within shelter communities. During the holiday season, volunteer groups put
on children’s Christmas parties and otherwise made merry at the communal shelters, filling them
with warmth, light, and laughter.66 Needless to say, shelter entertainers – and those who helped
organize shelter entertainment – can be counted among those “heroes” who upheld the Blitz
Spirit as it was portrayed in propaganda.
Similarly, many Britons displayed a remarkable sense of humor in the midst of chaos and
destruction throughout the Blitz – still more evidence that the propagandistic Blitz Spirit
reflected reality. During the Blitz, it was not unusual, especially in larger cities, to wake up and
discover that one’s favorite local shop had been demolished. It was also common, however, for
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stores which had sustained significant damage overnight to open up the very next day. What is
more, storeowners often made light of less-than-ideal situations. Many displayed signs bearing
hilarious quips such as “More open than usual,” both poking fun at the enemy and wryly
commenting on their own tenacity. Famously, one pub put up a sign which read, “Our windows
are gone but our spirits are excellent. Come in and try them.” The latter phrase cleverly
references the core concepts of the Blitz Spirit, appealing to both the customer’s heart and his
funny bone.67 One 1940 propaganda film celebrated such signs – “the signs of our times” – as
clear proof that the Blitz Spirit was alive and strong among the people of Britain. In the film, a
storeowner smiles as she shows off a sign which reads, “Keep Smiling! We Are.” Another sign
cheekily requests that visitors enter through the door, since “Hitler Came Through the Window.”
Still another sign, placed in the space where a storefront window used to be, bears only the word
“BLAST.” Beside the sign sit two mannequins, or at least what is left of them – one of them has
been reduced to just a pair of legs, which have been jauntily positioned upside-down to showcase
the shoes still on their feet.68 Furthermore, cheerful slogans like “business as usual” and “London
can take it” became ubiquitous, stabilizing, unifying rallying cries that would help carry the
country to victory.69
There is no question, therefore, that the most basic elements of the idealistic Blitz Spirit –
self-sacrifice, unity, and cheerful endurance among them - were present in some capacity in the
demeanor of the British people during the Blitz. One cannot deny that the Blitz dramatically
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strengthened many Britons’ sense of connection to and responsibility towards one another, nor
that the country often managed to laugh away immense pain and sorrow. Thus, claims that the
Blitz Spirit was a fraudulent myth, created for the purposes of boosting morale, intimidating
enemies, or manufacturing unity, are oversimplifying the story. At the same time, however, there
is no evidence which suggests that the Blitz Spirit was as pure, consistent, and ubiquitous as
wartime propaganda proclaimed that it was. These same basic elements were, at times, grossly
exaggerated, and it is these exaggerations which have survived in Britain’s memory.
Exaggerations and Fabrications within the Propagandistic Blitz Spirit
Skeptical, and even disillusioned, many historians are seeking to reveal the limits of the
idealistic Blitz Spirit that has become so integral to the identity of modern Britain. According to
the least extreme version of their viewpoint, the Blitz Spirit is “a myth; not…a lie about Britain’s
past, but a simplified version of events that suppresses less popular memories.”70 Other Blitz
Spirit doubters, often expressing themselves in mainstream media opinion pieces in relation to
current events, are neither so moderate nor so gentle with their criticism. Richard Overy, history
professor at the University of Exeter, recently published a piece in which he describes the Blitz
Spirit as a “cruel myth” and argues that “wartime leaders disguised the awful reality of being
bombed with tales of British resolve”.71 Meanwhile, Steven Fielding, political history professor
at the University of Nottingham, took aim at the Blitz Spirit in a Financial Times article titled,
“The Spirit of the Blitz Isn’t Back, It’s Bunk.”72 In their article “Public Panic and Morale,”
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historians Edgar Jones, Robin Woolven, Bill Durodié, and Simon Wessely boldly point out the
utter unreliability of the Ministry of Information’s weekly – and sometimes daily – “morale
reports.” Indeed, although these reports were based on data collected by police, postal censorship
workers, news agents, and organizations like Mass-Observation, they were ultimately created by
just two officials, and their purpose was to soothe the public. This left the door wide open for
bias and exaggeration. Instead of giving Britain an accurate picture of the country’s morale, the
Ministry likely treated these reports like opportunities to validate their propaganda campaigns.73
Thus, any historical conclusions about the reality of the Blitz Spirit that are based on these
reports are not worth much, many historians argue. As these historians dive deeper into this
topic, they are uncovering more and more discrepancies between reality and the ideal of the Blitz
Spirit, as well as inaccuracies and misrepresentations within evidence typically used to defend
Britain’s traditional understanding of it.
One of the primary motivations of these skeptical historians is to properly acknowledge
the great suffering and the genuinely human emotions of the British people during perhaps their
darkest hour. Indeed, they are eager to highlight that panic, hysteria, grief, and depression were
not absent from the civilian response to the Blitz. Blitz Spirit propaganda continuously
reinforced the idea that every Briton sat quietly, patiently, even cheerfully in the dark while
waiting for the night’s raid to end, but this is simply not true.74 The panic portrayed in MassObservation’s early morale reports was never truly vanquished, only dulled by time and
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experience.75 The fact that the government’s mental health clinics remained mostly empty during
the Blitz is often used to argue that the British people were immune to the emotional and
psychological trauma of war. It is widely admitted that the incidence of reported psychiatric
disorders caused by the Blitz was low – much lower than the country’s leaders had anticipated –
but an upswing in medical issues like angina attacks, miscarriages, peptic ulcers, and coronary
symptoms suggests that the bombing put British civilians under enough emotional stress to have
physiological effects.76 According to stacks of wartime diaries now held by the Imperial War
Museum, many civilians suffered physical symptoms of fear, such as hair loss and chronic
stomachaches. In fact, it was quite common for people to describe their fear in terms of their
physical symptoms in their diaries. Historian Amy Bell argues that this pattern represents an
attempt by the British people to interpret their emotions as burdens heroically borne – and
suppressed. In this way, a woman who lost hair due to stress was not guilty of cowardice;
instead, she was a wartime hero, willing to lose her hair for the war effort without complaint. The
hair loss would also serve as proof that she had endured much for her country. These
physiological symptoms were thus considered badges of the Blitz Spirit.77 Today, however, they
are often left out of the conversation, creating the illusion of a perfectly – robotically – calm and
cheerful civilian response to the Blitz.
Just as the physiological effects of stress were not considered symptoms of mental illness
during the Blitz, the low incidence of psychiatric problems in the wake of the Blitz may have
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been exaggerated in a number of ways. First, because individuals with mental illness were
stigmatized during this period of history, many people may have chosen not to seek treatment.
Second, it is likely that many psychologists downplayed their patients’ symptoms out of patriotic
pride in Britain’s ability to “keep calm and carry on.”78 Similarly, large-scale reactions of panic
were often ignored, if not covered up, by the press. After a particularly devastating attack that
wiped out the majority of the town’s major structures and many personal residences, Coventry
succumbed to despair. Chaos reigned. People wept and screamed in the streets, and some even
attacked firefighters that were trying to restore some semblance of order. Coventry’s Blitz Spirit
– and its sanity – was seemingly non-existent in the wake of this attack, but this story is often
absent from conversations about the Blitz Spirit.79 One particularly shocking tale of senseless
death, seldom told, is the loss of almost 200 shelterers in the Bethnal Green Underground station.
On the night of the “crush,” hundreds of Britons mistook the sound of anti-aircraft rockets for
exploding bombs and scattered, searching desperately for cover. As a large group of shelterers
filed frantically down the staircase of the Bethnal Green Underground station, which had no
central railing, 173 people were trampled and suffocated. This tragedy was not publicly
recognized, however, until after the war had ended, as government officials believed that
publishing such a story would be detrimental for morale.80 Some may view the practice of not
reporting large scale failures of the Blitz Spirit, such as the “crush” at the Bethnal Green
Underground station and the meltdown in Coventry, as an effective method of preventing panic.
In reality, however, such a practice merely preserved ignorance, and thus greatly diminished the
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demand for bravery from British citizens. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that these isolated
instances of widespread panic are often not mentioned in today’s Blitz Spirit debate because they
are not considered “the norm.”
Besides fear, Britons displayed many other emotions and behaviors which did not align
with the propagandistic definition of the Blitz Spirit. When the Blitz began, a wave of
superstition washed over Britain, which may be interpreted as a sign of weakness incompatible
with the Blitz Spirit. Many people, for example, carried good luck charms or talismans with them
everywhere. Others avoided wearing certain colors or taking shelter with certain people. Still
others religiously performed (or did not perform) mundane tasks as if their lives depended on
them, much like how sports fans trust that their teams will do well if they observe special game
day rituals. Meanwhile, unruly, unpatriotic behavior flourished alongside acts of kindness in
communal shelters.81 In fact, according to Mass-Observation’s reports, the demeanor of the Tube
shelterers – heralded as heroes by government propaganda – was frequently far from civil. There
was often pushing, shoving, and budging in line when the doors to the Underground stations
opened in the morning. People naturally complained about inconveniences and perceived
injustices as they waited for another long night to end, petty theft and vandalism were regular
problems, and fights over spots on the platform floor were not unheard of.82
Some of the conflict and unrest witnessed in communal shelters was stirred up
intentionally by Communist party activists, who were eager to take advantage of lapses in the
Blitz Spirit. The fact that these activists sometimes succeeded in causing trouble is evidence that
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the Blitz Spirit was more limited than government propaganda was willing to concede.83 So, too,
is the prejudice towards both Jewish Britons and members of the lower classes which persisted
throughout the war. Despite the government’s constant calls for unity among all Britons, these
groups were officially identified as subpopulations that might sow seeds of panic and
discontent.84 Ironically, it was these subpopulations who had the least access to proper sheltering
provisions.85 Some, knowingly or unknowingly, began to blame the Jewish population for their
suffering. Many complained, for example, that Jews were taking over the shelters. Others
believed that the majority of evacuees from heavily-bombed areas – presumably the cowards –
were Jewish. Still others expressed their anti-Semitic feelings through graffiti.86 In particular,
much derision was cast upon those Jews who could afford to move out of large cities like
London to escape the bombing.87 Anti-Semitism was not new to Britain during World War II,
but the stress of enduring the Blitz undoubtedly fed feelings of prejudice. This idea is supported
by the fact that Anti-Semitic sentiments began to return to their “normal” levels as the Blitz wore
on and people got used to their new wartime lifestyle.88 Meanwhile, evacuees from lower class
neighborhoods often did not receive a warm welcome in the countryside – a glaring
counterargument to the idea that the Blitz Spirit bridged all gaps between socioeconomic groups.
Many evacuees out of London boycotted rest centers set up by local authorities as a protest
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against the unwelcoming attitude of “upper class country people.”89 Even the “heroic”
Underground shelterers endured ridicule and scorn. Many train passengers resented the presence
of these shelterers, annoyed and upset that they had to look at and pass through throngs of people
whom they had long regarded as dirty, lazy, and cowardly.90 Contrary to the rhetoric of the Blitz
Spirit campaign, Britain’s supply of patience and tolerance could be and was exhausted during
the Blitz.
At the same time, many Britons put patriotism to the side during the Blitz and looked out
only for themselves, sometimes even capitalizing on the chaos caused by the air raids. For
example, workers regularly ignored the government’s warnings that strikes would indirectly help
the Germans win the war.91 Indeed, by 1944, Britain had experienced over 2,000 strikes, mostly
industrial. This indicates that unrest regularly punctured the Blitz Spirit, especially among the
working classes, who were preoccupied with merely feeding, clothing, and sheltering their
families.92 In addition, both regular and juvenile crime increased dramatically during the war.
Looting became so common that the police were forced to create anti-looting
squads.93 Some Britons joined demolition gangs for the sole purpose of seizing prime
looting opportunities. These crooks pinched and pilfered not only from damaged buildings, but
also from the unconscious bodies of bomb victims, as well as from fellow volunteers who were
helping to clean up the mess and save lives. Furthermore, looting was a popular topic for gossip,
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and most considered it to be a real issue. Suspecting one’s neighbors of looting was certainly not
part of maintaining the Blitz Spirit, but it was a common wartime fear.94
Interestingly, some of the ways that Britons upheld the core characteristics of the Blitz
Spirit clashed with the patriotic ethos of the era. For example, in order to remain cheerful, many
sought to put the war – and thus the home front effort – at the back of their minds. When they
had recognized that German attacks on civilians were inevitable, the British Government had
hurriedly braced the country for heavy bombing, but at the same time, they had neglected to
provide Britons with vital distractions from the gloom of their Blitz existence. Indeed, many
public places closed their doors when the war broke out, significantly reducing one’s options for
entertainment. This oversight ultimately limited the potential of the country to “keep smiling
through,” as escapism proved key to boosting morale. Indeed, those places which maintained
more of their leisure institutions were less prone to panic and despair, especially among the
working class. Cities that chose to keep their public houses open were more cheerful than cities
that did not, and music halls kept many communities calm. Notably, “overly patriotic” acts were
not nearly as popular as acts which featured more off-color humor, as the former spoiled the
audience’s escapism. In the end, while some Britons were able to put on a smile by forgetting all
about the Blitz Spirit, the people as a whole expressed disinterest in resuming their typical leisure
activities.95
It is clear, therefore, that the Blitz Spirit is a myth in the sense that it frequently fell short
of its propagandistic portrayals. There were limits to the people’s self-sacrifice, cheerfulness, and
sense of unity, and those limits were often breached. At the same time, however, one cannot
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discount the heroic attitudes and actions of the British during the Blitz simply because they were
not sustained. While contemporary propaganda painted an unrealistic picture of the civilian
response, this picture was nonetheless founded upon some reality. The question then becomes
not whether this stereotypical version of the Blitz Spirit existed – it did, just not all the time – but
rather what the Blitz Spirit looked like on an everyday basis. If it was not always heroic, then in
what more subtle ways was the Blitz Spirit maintained?
The True Blitz Spirit
Somewhere in between the two extremes of real and fake lies a more nuanced
understanding of what the Blitz Spirit actually was. Occasionally displayed in a flashy act of
heroism, and occasionally rejected out of fear and selfishness, the true nature of the Blitz Spirit is
perfectly captured in the now-famous slogan “keep calm and carry on.” Interestingly, while the
wartime poster bearing this phrase has recently become a sensation in popular culture, it was
never actually released during the Blitz. Indeed, believing that its message was the most
powerful of the three slogans originally conceived in 1939, the Ministry of Information held
back the poster, planning to print it in the wake of a particularly devastating attack. Little did the
Ministry know that such an attack would not come until September of 1940, by which time it had
changed its mind about the poster’s effectiveness 96 Still, the remarkable ability of the British
people to “keep calm and carry on” – to stoutly endure in a time of great fear, sorrow,
gloominess, and exhausting monotony – stands alone as the truest and most authentic element of
the propagandistic Blitz Spirit.
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In his book Advertising and Propaganda in World War II: Cultural Identity and the Blitz
Spirit, David Clampin points out that only those Britons who lived in large cities experienced a
steady stream of action during the Blitz. In smaller towns, air raids were relatively rare
occurrences. His argument, however, is not that the Blitz Spirit was restricted to those
perpetually targeted cities, nor that the Blitz Spirit was upheld only by those who did not bear the
brunt of the attacks. Instead, he claims that the British demonstrated their great bravery and
strength not only by surviving terrifying bombing raids, but also by weathering the intense
tedium and melancholy which often characterized life during the Blitz. Brief bouts of heroics
were followed by long droughts of wartime depression, but the British persisted doggedly. In
other words, they continued to live their ordinary lives in an extraordinary time. Clampin insists
that it was their dedication to such a dull and exhausting wartime routine that made them
“heroes.” Furthermore, Clampin describes the Blitz Spirit as being more of a “state of mind”
than a course of action, focused on self-restraint rather than the performance of heroics. In the
end, the nation was in desperate need of civilians who would “keep calm and carry on” – even
when they felt like panicking, even when they were deprived of sleep, and even when they lost
their homes overnight – and the British people evidently rose to that challenge.97 In Clampin’s
explanation of the Blitz Spirit, endurance, stubborn resolve, and force of habit replace patriotic
duty, perfect harmony, and unbeatable cheerfulness as the primary components. According to
this ideology, the meat of the Blitz Spirit did not consist of heroic volunteer work or grand acts
of kindness paid to strangers, but rather the small battles Britons had to fight just to survive
another day.98 For example, after not sleeping for most of the night, many people had to walk a
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long way to work because their trains had stopped running, but this did not stop them from
maintaining their normal routines, and they often did so without bemoaning their chronic
weariness. In support of this idea, Harrisson goes so far as to suggest that sleep deprivation was
the greatest challenge faced by British civilians during the Blitz, not the temptation to panic and
surrender.99 In this way, while Clampin denies the Blitz Spirit as an inborn and effortless
immunity to the stresses of war, he simultaneously recognizes it as Britain’s great struggle for
survival against all odds.
Briefly resting on a more cynical note, Clampin also acknowledges evidence that
diminishes the greatness of Britain’s feat. He concludes that if the Blitz Spirit does represent a
transformation of Britain’s character, it may have been fashioned merely by the constraints of
Britain’s situation during the Blitz, and not by any discerning effort on the part of the civilians
themselves. In other words, Clampin argues that the Blitz Spirit may have been forced out of
Britons; people “kept calm and carried on” because they had no other choice. Similarly, instead
of creating a brand new culture to match their brand new existence, Clampin believes that the
British clung to the familiar. The grim determination of the Blitz Spirit was thus derived from a
pervasive, steadfast hope that life would soon return to normal if only they all did their part. It
was only instinctive for them to try to protect their way of life.100 Some are even beginning to
question whether a happy face can be trusted as evidence of cheerfulness among Britons during
the Blitz. According to historian Geoffrey Field, “The public cheerfulness, so often referred to in
the press, was not just a fiction, but there was a manic quality to the merriment, a silly giddiness
that reflected the supercharged nature of life and the need for cathartic release.” 101 Indeed, one
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might argue that in some cases, people needed to remain cheerful in order to retain their sanity.
This means that while laughing and making jokes in the face of danger and gloom was an act of
bravery in some cases, in others, it was merely a means of survival.102 In the end, one might say
that the survivors of the Blitz were not born great, but rather that they had greatness thrust upon
them – and had no choice but to accept it.
Meanwhile, Britain’s shockingly smooth transition to life under fire becomes somewhat
less miraculous when one recalls that the British had plenty of time to prepare themselves for this
change. Indeed, some even welcomed the end of the “Phoney War.” Stretching from September
of 1939 to June of 1940, this tense period of watching and waiting hardened Britain’s civilians,
giving them a chance to slowly settle into their new wartime lifestyle and accept the inevitability
of total war. Before facing air raids, they tackled blackouts, conscription, rationing, and many
more frightening wartime inconveniences. Thus, by the time the bombs dropped, the British were
used to making sacrifices for the war effort. Any lifestyle changes that came with the beginning
of the Blitz were merely extensions of what they had already been experiencing, making them
much easier to bear.103 Similarly, many Britons who were in frequent and close contact with the
bombing soon became desensitized to it. As aforementioned, a large number of civilians were
almost killed during the Blitz, and after the rush of patriotic pride that usually accompanied such
experiences had subsided, they were left with an enhanced ability to face future raids. Having
already suffered the worst, these survivors now viewed the bombing as merely a chronic
nuisance, part of a humdrum routine. Furthermore, many who had experienced close calls firmly
believed that their chances of having another were slim, as if miraculous survival was an antidote
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for all future danger. This false sense of security undoubtedly helped Britons adopt the Blitz
Spirit more readily.104 In some cases, the British Government was willing to prioritize preserving
this illusion over protecting the people from physical harm. Indeed, the government ordered
heavy night fire during London air raids not for the purpose of defending the capital city – for
this tactic was largely ineffective – but to ease the fears of civilians, understanding that most
Londoners would quickly trade their precious sleep for the reassuring sounds of guns firing at the
enemy. Although anti-aircraft shrapnel injured many people and damaged much property during
the war, the government knew that doing nothing while the country was being attacked from
above would deal a severe blow to morale.105 Finally, Britain’s response to the Blitz was more
resilient than anyone had expected partially because the bombing itself was never as intense as
they had assumed it would be.106
Clampin’s moderate – and more realistic – understanding of the Blitz Spirit was actually
promoted during the Blitz alongside the more dramatic version. Indeed, Quentin Reynolds
testifies to the tenacity of British civilians near the end of “London Can Take It,” poignantly
saying, “Britain doesn’t look down upon the ruins of its houses, upon those made homeless
during the night, upon the remains of churches, hospitals, workers’ flats. Britain looks upward
towards the dawn and faces the new day with calmness and confidence.”107 Signs placed in front
of bomb-damaged stores bearing messages such as “Never mind the blasted windows – business
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as usual” demonstrated a similar solemn stubbornness.108 Still another source which bore witness
to the quiet strength of Britons during the Blitz was Edward R. Murrow’s CBS/BBC radio
program series “London After Dark.” The first broadcast in this series, appropriately titled
“London After Dark,” features Murrow’s description of a terrifying Blitz scene and the Britons
who were walking calmly through it. Positioned in Trafalgar Square, with air raid sirens blaring
loudly behind him and search lights shining above him, Murrow marvels at the bravery of the
British, who he calls “ghosts shod with steel shoes.” Meanwhile, at the famous dance hall
Hammersmith Palais, Murrow’s partner Eric Servareid reports that over a thousand people have
decided to dance through the air raid rather than huddle underground. 109 In another broadcast, “A
Few German Pilots,” Murrow declares, “The attacks will probably increase in intensity, but
things will have to get much worse before anyone here is likely to consider it too much to
bear.”110 Finally, in “Christmas/So Long and Good Luck,” Murrow paints a bleak picture,
lamenting that London’s church bells were not used to ring in the holiday, but to warn everyone
that an air raid was about to begin. He muses, “This is not a merry Christmas in London,” yet he
does find traces of merriment in London’s Tube shelters in the form of Christmas trees and carol
sings. Instead of wishing listeners a “merry Christmas,” Murrow reiterates a grim but determined
phrase popular among Londoners at the time: “So long and good luck.” 111
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Perhaps the true Blitz Spirit was best captured by artists of the time, and in particular by
those who were motivated by a desire to preserve the past and a need to process their own
emotions. One such artist, an English sculptor by the name of Henry Moore, created a series of
Blitz-related sketches in 1940 which eventually became known as his “Shelter Drawings.”
Regarding the reliability of Moore’s work for historical purposes, it is important to note that
many of the sketches in this series did not belong to the vast body of propaganda pieces ordered
by the government. Moore started this project as a personal form of release for his wartime
emotions, and for many months, he did not tell anyone except his wife that he was making these
“Shelter Drawings.” Eventually, the War Artists Advisory Committee approached him to recruit
his talents for the war effort, but because the sketches were originally made with no audience in
mind, they are more likely to reflect reality than other propaganda pieces. Inspired by Moore’s
own experiences in London’s Tube shelters, this collection of sketches makes visual the very
essence of the “keep calm and carry on” slogan. 112 Positions of Shelterers, for example, depicts a
number of faceless figures in a Tube shelter during a nighttime air raid. In the foreground, a
woman sits on the ground and quietly knits. Not far from her, a child impassively reads a book or
a newspaper. In the back half of the sketch, one figure has laid him or herself down for a nap,
and another cuddles a baby in her lap. Like many of the “Shelter Drawings,” this sketch was
done in black and white, perhaps symbolizing the somberness of wartime Britain. At the same
time, however, the overarching tone of the sketch is tranquil and forbearing. 113 Another sketch,
Tube Shelter Perspective, features a sea of indistinct figures lying on the floor of a train tunnel.
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Ghostly pale and defined by just a few dark, untidy lines, these figures resemble half-skeletons,
desperate for a little rest. At the same time, however, this blank-faced, jumbled mass of
shelterers, scarcely distinguishable from one another, exudes a sense of anonymous unity with
which many Britons could relate. This depiction of the Tube shelterers as strong and determined,
yet weary and waning may suggest that Moore accepted – and, indeed, was proud of – the
imperfect reality of Britain’s civilian response. He detected beauty in these tired figures’
endurance. He did not consider his gritty “Shelter Drawings” to be incompatible with his belief
in the Blitz Spirit.114
Historians are also exploring the true meanings of panic and morale in relation to the
Blitz Spirit. Harrisson, for example, arrives at the conclusion that cheerfulness is not a crucial
aspect of high morale, as many political leaders have suggested throughout history. Instead, he
claims that being able to function in the midst of chaos is the mark of a man with high morale,
even if his face wears a frown. He also explains that morale is constantly fluctuating, and that
panic is sometimes induced more often by the fear of something happening than by the actual
events themselves. He writes, “Man’s day-to-day, erratic resilience was the vital factor ignored
in pre-war prophesies.”115 Meanwhile, one’s concept of what constitutes an act of panic colors
one’s perception of how the Blitz Spirit played out in reality. For example, during the Blitz, the
Ministry of Information deemed “trekking” an act of cowardice, but in reality, there were many
rational reasons why people may have chosen to flee to the countryside during raids. Instead of
spending their nights in uncomfortable, overfilled, disease-ridden shelters, trekkers went where
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they knew they would be safe and could get a good night’s sleep.116 In general, panic is defined
as fear-driven actions characterized by irrationality. According to this ideology, someone who
runs frantically into the street during an air raid rather than calmly seeking shelter is panicstricken. Furthermore, calmness does not equate to the absence of emotion; to panic is to let
one’s emotions dictate irrational responses. This means that one might be “panicking” inwardly
without acting out of panic.117 With the clarification of these two definitions comes a
clarification of the true Blitz Spirit. Although British civilians may not have displayed a steady
stream of behaviors consistent with propagandistic standards, some of their seemingly cowardly
or unenthusiastic responses may be interpreted as manifestations of the Blitz Spirit after all.
Investigating why the Blitz Spirit played out the way it did in different settings and
situations also helps separate fact from fiction. Indeed, taking note of the circumstances that
produced pockets of Blitz Spirit fervor – or a lack thereof – can help historians better understand
what the Blitz Spirit really was, and how it might be recreated in the present. During the war,
stereotypes were created regarding which populations were properly upholding the Blitz Spirit
and which were not. For example, there existed the idea that members of the lower classes in
northern Britain maintained the Blitz Spirit with less effort than their southern counterparts
because they had grown culturally accustomed to hardship. Mass-Observation’s data seemed to
validate this stereotype, and it was taken as solid fact that northerners were cheerful and
hardworking individuals, and that southerners were sour slackers who detracted from the
country’s overall chances of survival. In reality, these stereotypes were based on a perfect storm
of circumstances that set some groups at a disadvantage when it came to displaying the Blitz
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Spirit. For example, members of the lower classes tended to live in the center of their cities –
precisely where the Germans concentrated their bombing raids. This meant that the poor were
disproportionately burdened by the Blitz in most cities. Not only were their homes destroyed, but
their transportation, places of leisure – movie theaters, public houses, and the like – and public
utility services were also affected. Not being able to travel was particularly hard for many
Britons to bear. In addition, the destruction of shopping centers tended to put a dent in civilian
morale, especially for working women, as they did not have time to wait in long lines that were
created by the situation. Believing they would lead to fear-driven hoarding and false scarcity, the
British Government feared these long lines. Likewise, in those places where new shopping
centers had recently opened, morale soared. Therefore, it makes sense that in those few cities
where bombing was not concentrated in the center of town, morale was higher. Similarly, in
cities in which all of the crucial buildings were not located in a central location, morale did not
dip as low as it did in cities where this was the case.118
Highly fractured London, for example, did not suffer in the same way that small,
centralized cities like Manchester did. Coventry and Hull – small cities – lost all of their
significant structures in a single night, leading to a dramatic drop in morale. Thus, northern cities
like Liverpool were seen as upholding the Blitz Spirit more diligently than other cities in the
south simply because life was not as disrupted here as much as it was in other places. Their
important shopping centers, transportation infrastructure, and public utility services were
scattered throughout the city, so the damage done to the city was more scattered, and thereby less
devastating. Even in Liverpool, however, certain groups suffered more than others, namely those
living in the suburb of Merseyside. Because of intense bombing here, people were forced to
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sleep under the stars in fields on the farthest edges of town. Here, as in centralized cities like
Manchester, Hull, and Coventry, people were deprived not only of their homes, but also of the
entertainment, commodities, and conveniences that would have otherwise provided them with
comfort and familiarity in wartime. The inaccuracy of Mass-Observation’s initial conclusions
partially stemmed from the fact that the organization’s agents only interviewed Liverpudlians
who lived in the center of town, and not Merseyside residents.119
The Britishness of the Blitz Spirit
Having established how the true Blitz Spirit strayed from its propagandistic portrayals, I
now investigate the Britishness of the Blitz Spirit. As aforementioned, a crucial assumption that
went along with the Blitz Spirit was that it had been born out of unique aspects of British culture.
Churchill championed this idea, insisting that the people of Britain, young and old, would “never
surrender” because of an inherent British strength that had been awakened in them by the events
of the Blitz.120 Upon examining the civilian responses of other countries to air raid campaigns
similar to the Blitz, however, I conclude that the Blitz Spirit was definitely not exclusive to
Britain.
Germany’s Blitz began in the spring of 1942 and lasted three long years. Just as in
Britain, German civilians were transformed into soldiers seemingly overnight as the violence of
war was brought to their front door. Special targets included large cities like Berlin, Hamburg,
Cologne, and Dresden, but in the end, all of Germany was affected to some extent.121 The
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number of casualties was staggering. In all, the Allied bombings of Germany killed 305,000
German people and destroyed 1,865,000 German homes. Many were forced to evacuate – or take
a nightly “trek” – to the countryside, and a whopping 20,000,000 were left with limited access to
basic utilities.122 Only cities that were perceived as being likely targets were given proper air raid
shelters, so many Germans did not have access to adequate shelter during raids, either. When
enemy planes approached their borders, the Germans’ radar gave them plenty of warning.
However, the Allies soon made a habit of taking roundabout routes to their targets, effectively
throwing the Germans off their scent and forcing them to alert all of western Germany whenever
a threat was detected. This meant that while many cities were only attacked from the air a few
times throughout the war, everyone lived in perpetual fear of an impending bombing raid. The
Germans referred to this state of affairs as a “war of nerves.” Thus, like British civilians during
the Blitz, the Germans were exhausted by nightly bomb scares.123 Germany’s losses during this
air raid campaign were naturally higher than Britain’s during the Blitz due to its extended
duration and increased intensity. Thus, any signs of the Blitz Spirit displayed by the German
people during this campaign - and particularly near the end of it - must be viewed as equally
resilient, if not more so than what the British displayed.
The Allies firmly believed that their strategic air raids would deliver the enemy into their
hands by turning the Germans against their leadership, decreasing overall unity, and convincing
the people to clamor for a swift end to the war. The goal was to cause enough physical
discomfort and emotional distress to force them to surrender, and perhaps even welcome the
Allies with open arms. In a special attempt to both damage Germany’s economy and rekindle old
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feelings of hostility and resentment between the country’s socioeconomic classes, the Allies
targeted the German war industry especially.124 To decimate morale was, of course, the aim of
the Blitz as well.125 Churchill argued that the British people were eager for revenge, going so far
as to suggest that British morale depended on some kind of equivalent retaliation.126 In the end,
however, while the raids would cause great destruction and greatly exacerbate the Germans’
misery, they would prove to be utterly ineffective in breaking the Germans’ will to fight their
Fuhrer’s war. Indeed, many remained loosely loyal to the Nazis until the very end, and morale
did not take any devastating dips until early 1945, when the Germans suddenly realized that they
were really and truly headed for defeat.127 One might argue that the Germans’ fear of the wrath
of their totalitarian government outstripped their fear of Allied bombs, but in turn, one might also
argue that the British “kept calm and carried on” because they felt powerless to stop the war as
mere civilians. Amidst great destruction and death, German civilians continued to trudge through
their daily wartime routines, just as the British did during the Blitz.128
Like the British, the Germans did not show much concern for their safety before the
bombs dropped. Instead, many thought up long lists of reasons why their hometowns would not
be affected by the air raids that were sure to come. At the same time, however, the Germans had
some time to come to terms with what they all knew was in store for them – just as the British
had time to prepare themselves mentally for the Blitz during the “Phoney War.”129 The Germans’
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response to the bombing of their homeland was also similar to that of the British. Surviving the
attacks was difficult for many to bear, but in the words of historian Katrin Schreiter, “Personal
despair did not translate into collective resignation and a large-scale refusal to continue the
war.”130 Even more illuminating are the testimonials of the German civilians themselves. For
example, when asked about Germany’s civilian morale during World War II, one civilian
responded patriotically, “They can’t say in this war the home front betrayed the fighting front.
We did all we could, hung on till the last.”131 This quote reveals major themes in contemporary
German culture during the war. Referencing the horrors of Germany’s World War I defeat, the
Nazis carefully built up the idea that Germany’s civilians were intimately connected to the
country’s soldiers on the battlefield, that they were all fighting for the same cause together, and
that if one group – the soldiers or the civilians – did not do its duty, it would let the other group
down. Thus, according to this Nazi ideology, the civilians were capable of delivering a “stab in
the back” to their country’s soldiers if their response to the Allied bombings were weak or
disorganized.132
Furthermore, like Britain’s civilians, the Germans had their dazzling wartime hero stories
– some true and some exaggerated – which colored their perception of their own response to the
bombings. For example, in some close-knit communities, mainly located in lower-class, urban
neighborhoods, people put helping their neighbors above tending to their own family members.
In a grand display of unity and patriotic pride, the town of Darmstadt awarded special badges for
bravery to all those civilians who were injured during the air raids – badges which were
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displayed proudly by their owners.133 At the same time, there were significant gaps in the
Germans’ “Blitz Spirit.” Many Germans, for example, openly attacked their political leaders,
complaining about inadequate shelters and provisions, insensitive propaganda campaigns
focused on the loss of German landmarks rather than German lives, their military’s inability to
provide any sort of effective defense against the bombers, and their brave Fuhrer’s total absence
from the scenes of destruction. Some openly threw Hitler under the bus, jauntily reciting, “Dear
Tommy, please fly further on your way; spare us poor miners for today. Fly instead against those
people in Britain; they’re the ones who voted Hitler in.”134 Evidently, the Germans were fiercely
loyal to their country and their people, but they were far from blind to their government’s flaws
during the war.
Perhaps most strikingly, the German Government’s wartime rhetoric greatly resembled
Britain’s propagandistic Blitz Spirit. Indeed, in an attempt to distract both German civilians and
the rest of the world from the imperialistic and genocidal crimes committed by the Nazis, the
government used the terrifying experiences of German bomb victims to construct a narrative of
victimhood in post-war Germany. Besides deflecting guilt for the destruction and death of World
War II, this victim narrative maintained that the air raids had merely served to unify, and thus
strengthen, German society. This German claim of community in the aftermath of war –
“Schichksalgemeinschaft” – was nearly identical to the Blitz Spirit narrative. Just like Britain,
Germany regularly published civilian morale reports, and just like Britain, the German
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Government’s general consensus was that not even heavy bombing had devastating effects on
civilian morale.135
In the end, what matters is not that the Germans failed to live up to their government’s
propagandistic standards - the British certainly did not do so – but rather that they managed to
hold out as long as they did. Although they were condemned to a nightmarish existence, living
among piles of rubble and swarms of rats with the grim reaper lurking around every corner, the
German civilians continued to live their lives. Their collective response was not marked by
cheerfulness in any sense of the word, but they endured. To some extent, they kept calm and
carried on.136 Just as the Blitz did not cripple British morale, so too did the Allied bombings of
Germany fail to bring a swift end to the war. Many Allied leaders had expected the people of
Germany to become so miserable that they would eventually force their own government to give
up, but they did not. Although the bombing raids did strengthen many civilians’ opposition to
Hitler and his Nazis, they also gave the British a reputation of brutality which convinced the
Germans to fight harder rather than demand a surrender to the Allies. In this case, as in Britain,
civilians were caught up in their own war for survival in which the sole enemies were the planes
overhead.137
One might wonder why the Blitz is such a popular topic of discussion among professional
and amateur historians alike, while the Allied bombings of Germany are largely ignored.
Similarly, the heroic story of the German soldier has been told time and time again in many
popular books and films, while the heroic story of the German civilian has been sorely neglected
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by comparison. Some, like German writer W.G. Sebald, believe that the German survivors of
World War II often hesitated to celebrate their remarkable civilian response to the Allied
bombings because it reminded them of their shameful association with the losing side of an
infamous war - not to mention the horrors of the Holocaust. Furthermore, sympathetic nonGermans did not want to point out Germany’s bravery because they did not want to be accused
of portraying the enemy as victims, nor the victors as monsters.138 This collective lapse in
historical memory not only denies the courage of Germany’s civilian population during World
War II, but it also serves to reinforce the false idea that the Blitz Spirit was exclusively British.
Evidence of the Blitz Spirit has also been found in China’s civilian response during their
war with the Japanese. In Chongqing, China’s wartime capital, the air raid sirens sent civilians
scrambling for cover multiple times a day - for eight long years. In fact, the people of Chongqing
practically lived in their bomb shelters, which happened to be man-made caves carved out of the
side of mountains. While exceptionally safe, these shelters were, in many cases, cold, dark,
damp, and impossibly crowded. Furthermore, as in Britain and Germany, the constant bombing
of Chongqing deprived its residents of countless hours of precious sleep. Still, Chongqing’s
civilians did their best to make themselves at home in the cave shelters and maintain their morale
- certainly a sign of the Blitz Spirit.139
Evidence suggests that the Chinese were actually the most skilled of civilian shelters
during World War II, as they had the most experience. Indeed, the civilian casualty numbers
were comparatively low in Chongqing because of the superior structure of their bomb shelters,
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but this area endured the longest air raid campaign in history of the world. In addition, it was
easier in some ways for the British to “keep calm and carry on” because the Blitz was carried out
almost entirely under the cover of darkness. The British might have been exhausted when they
emerged from their shelters in the morning, but it was rare that the bombing itself would keep
them from going to work or to school. In Chongqing, on the other hand, it was common for
civilians to be confined to the cave shelters from 10 a.m. to 3:00 in the afternoon. As a result of
these two factors, the people of Chongqing became adept at putting their lives aside during air
raids and quickly picking them back up where they had left off once the skies had cleared.140
In a striking display of immense resilience, the people of Chongqing rebuilt their lives in
their cave shelters and “carried on,” seemingly as if the war did not affect them. People brought
in beds and other furniture to make their frequent stays more comfortable. Students continued to
study, by candlelight when necessary. People even set up small businesses in the shelters, selling
items like fresh fruit and cigarettes to shelterers. In the words of historian Tan Gang, “Bomb
shelters were important places for evading Japanese air attacks, making friends, relaxing,
working, and even studying”. Indeed, Gang compares the shelters to the Western-style bar or
café, places where people could go to chat about both their personal lives and the big issues of
the day. In essence, Chongqing’s cave shelters were merely intensified versions of Britain’s
Underground shelters. There is evidence that many spontaneous friendships were forged within
the shelters, and that people from diverse backgrounds were able to relate to one another because
of their shared wartime experiences. Notably, the bomb shelters also became places where
people could mingle with members of the opposite sex. Soon, close-knit communities formed
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which enhanced China’s wartime endurance, just like the communities that popped up in the
London Underground did.141
One key challenge to the idea that the Chinese displayed the Blitz Spirit during World
War II is Chongqing’s open acceptance of social inequality during the war. In fact, there was
open segregation of the social classes into public and private shelters, as well as a corresponding
gap in the quality of conditions and facilities within these two types of shelters, particularly when
it came to sanitation. The public shelters feigned to be little more than the caves they actually
were. In many such shelters, there were no lights or seats, despite the fact that both of these were
supposed to be provided by local officials. Even worse, people often relieved themselves
wherever they fancied in the public shelters, contributing to the spread of pests and disease.
Meanwhile, in the private shelters, wealthy civilians could enjoy not only electric lighting and
more comfortable seating, but also real floors, running water, and even telephone service! It was
not uncommon to find people playing a leisurely game of chess in these private shelters, and
some went so far as to hold banquets here. It was in these relatively luxurious shelters that
China’s government officials spent the war, and this was not unknown to the common people of
China. Thus, unity across socioeconomic lines was not a crucial component of the Blitz Spirit
according to the Chinese understanding of it. Instead of bringing people together, the segregated
shelter system only served to remind the people of the inequities embedded in their society.142
One must not forget, however, that the majority of those who took shelter in the London
Underground during the Blitz were members of the lower classes, and that they were forced to
do so because they could not find any adequate shelters within their poor and neglected
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neighborhoods.143 As discussed above, Britain’s unity was portrayed as much more robust and
pure than it was in reality; the war did not abolish Britain’s social hierarchies. Thus, to disqualify
China’s civilians as bearers of the Blitz Spirit would be an unfair exaggeration.
In her book Echoes of Chongqing: Women in Wartime China, Dr. Danke Li highlights the
quiet heroism of Chinese women during World War II. Li herself echoes historians like Clampin,
Harrisson, and Field, insisting that the greatest feats of the war were performed by ordinary
people doing ordinary things in an extraordinary time. Plagued by constant attacks from the
air, the women of Chongqing were not seen as heroes in their own time - they did not actively
fight in the war, and resistance against the enemy was considered a masculine responsibility and
privilege - but they represented the epitome of “keeping calm and carrying on” by simply taking
care of their homes and their families in the face of great hardship and peril.144 In Li’s own
words, “Chongqing women…demonstrated their resistance by staying alive and refusing to
die.”145 Indeed, while horrific events like the Rape of Nanjing are well-known today, they hardly
represent the true wartime experiences of most Chinese women. Instead, the undying
perseverance of Chinese women under fire serves as a better example of the Blitz Spirit in
action.146
A case may even be made for including the Japanese among those who showed the Blitz
Spirit. A large number of Japanese civilians fled their homes in panic within the last nine months
of the war, and by this time, the Japanese air force had all but stopped trying to defend them
from the Americans. Abandoning all anti-aircraft efforts, Japan did not attempt to create the
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illusion of resistance that both the British and German militaries had pulled off for the benefit of
their civilians’ sanity. In general, low morale was reported throughout Japan as the war was
drawing to a close. At the same time, however, one must take into account the unique
circumstances of the Japanese civilian. First, if the government and the military were not sending
reassuring messages to the Japanese people, they were already at a disadvantage when compared
to Britain and Germany. It is no wonder that they were more prone to outward displays of panic.
Perhaps even more importantly, Japan was relatively unprepared for such crippling aerial attacks.
As aforementioned, Britons had had time to cope with the possibility of the Blitz during the
“Phoney War,” and the Germans had had even more time to prepare themselves for war because
they were the ones who started it. Thus, although both Britain and Germany’s shelter systems
were inadequate in a number of ways, they were nowhere near as deficient as Japan’s, leaving
Japanese civilians to fend for themselves.147 In the end, it makes sense that Japan’s Blitz Spirit
was wearing thin by the end of the war, and to use Japan’s civilian response as evidence for a
British monopoly of the Blitz Spirit would be absurd.
With so much evidence to suggest that aerial bombardment is largely ineffective in
crushing civilian morale, yet very effective in inflicting great human suffering, can world leaders
use this tactic in good conscience during wartime? Harrisson poses this question in Living
Through the Blitz, exploring whether the Blitz was worth all of the money, men, and equipment
that the Germans spent on it, let alone the loss of innocent British lives that was caused by it.
Harrisson’s fascinating conclusion is that not only were Germany’s air raids not effective enough
to justify paying for them, but so were Britain’s bombing raids on Germany. He hastens to say
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that this conclusion applies only to these air raids as they were conducted, and not how they
might have been conducted. In the end, however, he returns to the fact that the massive amounts
of death and destruction caused by the Blitz were somehow “not terrible enough to disrupt the
basic decency, loyalty…morality and optimism of the vast majority,” thus insinuating that it is
unlikely that any attack on civilians from the air would not be effective enough to justify.148
Furthermore, the fact that World War II bombing raids were consistently ineffective suggests
that the Blitz Spirit was not a British invention, but rather the manifestation of a universally
human instinct to survive and preserve one’s way of life.
The Transformation and Entrenchment of the Blitz Spirit in Modern British Culture
Britain has long been notorious for her “stiff upper lip,” and today, many older Britons
deplore what they view as a modern age of “emotional incontinence.” These traditionalists are
disgusted by public displays of sorrow, trained to express their strongest emotions only in
private. In is precisely these Britons who continually point to Blitz survivors as heroes to imitate
in times of crisis.149 British leaders and journalists are particularly guilty of making this mistake.
They do not realize that when they call for a renewal of the Blitz Spirit, they are often setting
unrealistic expectations for the nation.
In a disgruntled news article, journalist Joel Golby accuses British leaders and journalists
of invoking the Blitz Spirit too frequently, and of using the concept to cover up their own
inadequacies. If the economy is failing, if crime is on the rise, or if infrastructure issues have
been neglected, the government can easily diffuse the blame for these problems by calling for a
renewal of the Blitz Spirit. Even worse, Golby claims, these British leaders glorify the wartime
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lifestyle, insinuating that they would rather have lived during the Blitz than in the present day.
Perhaps most damaging of all, they base their preaching on a grossly exaggerated version of
what the Blitz Spirit actually was, creating a rift between older and younger generations. 150
Historian Darren Kelsey has published multiple works about the Blitz Spirit and how it
has been used – and abused – in recent history. On July 7, 2005, a series of terrorist attacks on
the London public transit system resulted in the deaths of over 50 Britons. While combing
through hundreds of British newspaper articles written in the wake of the attacks, Kelsey
discovered that these articles were rife with references to the propagandistic Blitz Spirit
narrative, regardless of the individual journalists’ political leanings. Sometimes quoting British
leaders and sometimes using the phrases themselves, the journalists quickly resurrected familiar
wartime slogans like “London Can Take It” and leaned heavily on patriotic exaggerations of
bravery and righteous outrage. Stereotypical images of British unity, cheerfulness, and altruism
featured prominently in the articles. The journalists openly compared the actions of Blitz
survivors to the actions of Britons in the wake of the attacks, and images of bombed-out families
and shopkeepers carrying on with their daily routines accompanied every headline. Declaring a
state of unity across socioeconomic lines, one article claimed that “wise-cracking Cockneys” and
“smoothies from Chelsea” had responded to the terrorist attacks with the same strength and
courage. Harkening back to the idea that the Blitz Spirit belongs solely to the British, and that it
is an inherent trait with which all Britons are born, another article exclaimed “Brits are still made
of the Right Stuff”151 The presence of so many references to the Blitz Spirit in these articles not
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only suggests that Britain’s identity is founded upon the idea of the Blitz Spirit, but also that it is
still being used as a tool to mobilize the British people and boost their collective morale.
Kelsey appears to sympathize with Golby in some respects regarding the use of the Blitz
Spirit by modern British leaders. First, he is skeptical of the misplaced and convoluted
comparisons between the July 7th bombings and the Blitz. Indeed, surviving an isolated terrorist
attack can hardly be compared to enduring the pressures of a years-long air raid campaign.
Similarly, it is difficult to compare a domestic terror incident and a war in which all threats came
from external sources (Kelsey “media, myth, and terrorism” 2). In general, Kelsey argues, the
Blitz Spirit narrative might be used to depict Britain as a victim and deflect blame for
international problems. In the case of the July 7th bombings, some believe that Britain’s recent
foreign policy regarding the Middle East contributed to the attacks. Whether or not this is true,
when British leaders take up an aggressive Blitz Spirit narrative, this may prevent Britons from
having such conversations. In general, Kelsey insists that using the Blitz Spirit to drum up
morale during times of crisis may communicate to the British people that any feelings of fear,
panic, embarrassment, and even sadness that they experience are unpatriotic, and thus invalid.152
The fact that modern Britain’s impression of herself depends so heavily on the Blitz
Spirit stems from a much older image of Britain as a strong, stoic nation that never cries. In
Weeping Britannia: Portrait of a Nation in Tears, historian Thomas Dixon chronicles Britain’s
history with grief. Along the way, he sets out to prove that Britons can and do cry, and that they
have been doing so throughout their entire history. In doing this, Dixon challenges old
stereotypes about Britons that many Britons themselves hold dear. Yet even as he refutes crucial
assumptions of the propagandistic Blitz Spirit, he does not dismantle the more moderate – and
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realistic – understanding of the Blitz Spirit which many historians are now adopting. Instead, he
provides numerous examples of times when Britons have welcomed tears as evidence of
compassion rather than a violation of the Blitz Spirit.153
During World War II, British officers verbally attacked the enemy by accusing them of
emotional weakness. They insisted that “no Britisher ever weeps!” and boasted that while injured
German soldiers wept and moaned, Allied soldiers patiently waited for a cigarette and a cup of
tea. These hyperbolized messages reinforced the idea of the “stiff upper lip” in conjunction with
the Blitz Spirit, but Dixon discusses several instances in which a good cry was considered
patriotic (Dixon 239). For example, he points to one documented instance of Winston Churchill
– widely known as the Briton with the stiffest upper lip of all – weeping in front of hundreds of
bomb victims. When he visited Peckham in South London in the wake of a particularly
destructive air raid in September of 1940, he was so shocked by what he saw, and by the
enthusiasm of the bomb victims in welcoming him to what was left of their homes, that he
openly cried. In response, one woman was reported as saying, “You see, he really cares. He’s
crying.” Indeed, the people saw Churchill’s reaction as a display of humanity, not weakness. It
was alright that he failed to keep his composure in the presence of great British suffering, despite
the fact that his tears would have normally been considered taboo. Furthermore, journalists did
not hesitate to share this incident with the British public. In theory, crying was reserved for
overly emotional nations like France, Italy, and Germany, but in reality, the people of Britain not
only wept during the Blitz, but they were sometimes praised for doing so.154
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Once again, the evidence points to the conclusion that Britain is not, and never has been,
immune to panic and grief, as the propagandistic Blitz Spirit demands. Dixon’s work reveals the
absurdity of modern-day British leaders and journalists begging the country to buck up and relive
the Blitz Spirit. Like Kelsey and Golby, Dixon maintains that the Blitz Spirit – and Britain’s true
character in general – is often simplified to the point of misrepresentation. It is not inappropriate
to recall the great strength and bravery of the British people during the Blitz during times of
crisis, but claims that the country has grown soft since then represent a grave abuse of the true
Blitz Spirit.
In Weeping Britannia, Dixon also digs into the question of how the propagandistic Blitz
Spirit became engrained in British culture. He turns to contemporary cinema for answers. Many
films released in Britain during World War II featured elements of the Blitz Spirit in their plots
and characters, including altruism and fierce cheerfulness. Perhaps most popular of all was the
theme of not crying. Dixon finds this theme especially interesting because it was usually this
element of not crying that tended to make everyone in the audience cry. Dixon’s explanation for
this paradox is simple. During the war, many Britons became attached to the propagandistic idea
that they were invincible. They took comfort in this image of unwavering “Brit grit,” and they
began to gravitate towards books and films whose heroes and heroines fulfilled the unrealistic
expectations that they, themselves, could not achieve. Instead of seeing themselves as they were
and viewing their sadness and fear as legitimate parts of their response to the Blitz, they
preferred to create a new image of themselves in their heads that conformed to the propaganda
that was all around them. Thus, the British learned to become deeply emotional whenever they
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thought about overcoming one’s emotions for the greater good. Over time, this unattainable
ideal of the propagandistic Blitz Spirit did not fade.155

Conclusion
Modern messages and images associated with the Blitz Spirit and its legacy offer a
warped version of the events that supposedly represent the epitome of British character and
ability. Neither a fabrication nor a realized ideal, the true Blitz Spirit was as complex as the
people who displayed it. More than a handful of heroic acts, it also encompassed the many small
steps that Britons took every day to secure their survival. Aiming to impress the country’s allies,
its enemies, and its own people, the Blitz Spirit propaganda campaign focused largely on the
former, creating the stereotypical concept of the Blitz Spirit that has survived in Britain’s
memory. At the same time, however, those who dismiss Britain’s response to the Blitz as nothing
particularly inspirational are denying historical fact. The words of one British historian perfectly
capture this delicate balance of critical analysis and respectful admiration: “Despite modern
attempts at ‘de-bunking,’ wartime spirits were mostly high. We did not walk about with
permanent smiles…However, there was never any thought of surrendering…we always thought
we’d win the war.”156 In the end, it was the humdrum rather than the heroic, the ordinary rather
than the outstanding, that won the People’s War. Furthermore, although nothing can diminish the
bravery and stamina of the British people during the Blitz, this type of resilient response to
national crisis was certainly not unique to British culture, as evidenced by similar responses by
other civilian populations to similar air raid campaigns. Rather than bemoaning the limitations of
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Britain’s Blitz Spirit, however, British leaders would do well to embrace the truth, as this may
help prepare Britain to face future challenges with some form of the “stiff upper lip.”
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